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WILLIAM H. PIRKLE et al., Respondents, v. OAKDALE
UNION GRAMMAR SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants.
(1] Schools-Tort Liability-Officers and Employees.-The standard of care required of an officer or employee of a public
school is that which a person of ordinary prudence, charged
with his duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.
[2] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school district, its principal and physical education instructor for injuries sustained by student during noon recess while playing
touch football on team representing eighth grade against
team representing seventh grade, the fact that the method of
selecting players for free play games according to grades is
utilized throughout the state is competent evidence of the
reasonableness of its use by defendants.
(3] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school district, its principal and physical education instructor for injuries sustained by student during noon recess while playing
touch football on team representing eighth grade against
team representing seventh grade, evidence that touch football
is not a dangerous or rough game and testimony of witnesses
that, although practice of matching seventh against eighth
grade had been followed extensively throughout county, they
knew of no serious injury prior to the one sustained by plaintiff, compel conclusion that the method of segregation employed by defendants was a reasonable one.
[4] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school district, its principal and physical education instructor for injuries sustained !luring noon recess by a 97-pound student,
5 feet, 4 inches tall while blocking a 145-pound student, 5
feet, 10 inches tall during a game of touch football, evidence
that "exponent charts," used in connection with interscholastic
contests and in required physical education periods to classify
pupils according to certain combinations of age, height and
weight, were designed primarily to present equal opportunities
of competition and only partially for safety of participants,
and that the classifications are broad enough to permit a variation in weights at least as great as that involved in the
[1] See 10 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1947 Rev.), Schools, § 79.1 et
seq.; Am.Jur., Schools, § 56 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Schools, § 67; [2-6] Schools, § 74;
[7] Appeal and Error, § 1419.
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present case, fails to establish such charts as a standard of
care, the failure to observe which may be deemed negligence.
[5] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school district, its principal and physical education instructor for injuries sustained by student during noon recess while playing
touch football on team representing eighth grade against team
representing seventh grade, there is no legal basis for a finding
of negligence where such activity was not an inherently
dangerous one, the boys were selected according to their skill
and by a reasonable means of classification, they were properly
instructed, experienced and proficient, and they participated
in the game only if they chose to do so.
[6] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school district, its principal and physical education instructor for injuries sustained by student during noon recess while playing
touch football, defendants' liability may not be predicated on
a failure to provide prompt medical attention where plaintiffs'
medical expert, the sole witness to testify on this point, stated
that a layman could not reasonably have been expected to
discover the nature of the injury sooner and, in any event,
no injury resulted to the boy from the delay.
[7] Appeal-Directing Judgment for Opposite Party-Judgment
Notwithstanding Verdict.-Where it appears on appeal that
defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
for plaintiffs should have been granted, the appellate court
may order judgment to be so entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County and from an order denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by
student at school d'uring noon recess while playing touch football. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed with directions.
Vernon F. Gant, Frederick W. Reyland, ,Jr., County Counsel, and "\Villiam R. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for
Appellants.
C. Ray Robinson, Margaret A. Flynn, .James A. Cobey and
William B. Boone, for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-William H. Pirkle, an eighth grade student
at the Oakdale Union Grammar School, sustained injuries
while playing in a game of touch football. The chief ground
relied upon by the school district, B. W. Gripenstraw, its
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principal, and Jules Perrin, the instructor in physical education, for a reversal of the judgment against them and orders
denying certain motions is that there is no evidence upon
which liability for damages legally may be based.
The jury, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and giving them the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn from it, might have found
the following facts : During noon recess periods, the boys in
the seventh and eighth grades were permitted to engage in
"free play" activities. The games at such times included
touch football, in which a ''tackle'' is accomplished by touching the ball carrier with both hands. Bodily contact is limited
to a shoulder or body block, with both the blocker's feet on
the ground. When properly regulated, the game is not rough.
Free play games were not a part of the required physical
education program, and the boys participated in them only
if they elected to do so. A team representing the seventh
grade competed against another from the eighth grade. One
boy from each grade was captain and chose the players for
his team. As was , customary in free play games, the participants were not selected according to age, size, or weight.
As a consequence the players ranged in weight from 85 to
190 pounds.
At the time of the accident, William was a member of the
eighth grade team. He was 13 years, 4 months of age, 5
feet, 4 inches tall, and weighed approximately 97 pounds.
During the game he blocked Jack Perkins, a seventh grade
student weighing 145 pounds, who was 5 feet, 10 inches
tall, and 14% years old·. William was struck in the abdomen
by Jack's knee. He remained in the game for the next two
or three plays and then went to the sideline, where he lay
down on a bench.
He was soon sent to a first aid room where Gripenstraw had
him lie down and covered him with a blanket. Near the
close of the school day, Perrin came to see him. When William passed urine at Perrin's suggestion, it was observed that
the urine contained blood. Perrin then took William home.
This was about two hours after the accident. William's
spleen and left kidney were removed about five hours later.
John Pirkle, the boy's father, sued for damages in the
amount of his expenditures for William's medical care and,
as guardian ad litem for William, for damages for the injuries the boy sustained. The theory of the complaint was
that the defendants negligently failed properly to supervise
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the game, and that Gripenstraw and Perrin carelessly neglected to give William prompt medical attention. Named
as defendants were Perrin, Gripenstraw, the school district,
and the members of its board of trustees. The demurrer
of the trustees was sustained and the action dismissed as to
them.
During the trial, the motions of the defendants for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict were denied. The jury returned a verdict for William of $7,500 and awarded the
father $800. Motions by the defendants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied.
The appeal is from the judgment entered upon the verdict
and from an order denying the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The principal ground relied upon in challenging the judgment is that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict. It is argued that there is no evidence justifying the
jury's implied finding that the defendants were negligent in
supervising the game, or that William sustained injury because of a negligent failure to provide prompt medical attention.
[1] The standard of care required of an officer or employee of a public school is that which a person of ordinary
prudence, charged with his duties, would exercise under the
same circumstances. (Bellman v. San Francisco H. S. Dist.,
11 Cal.2d 576, 582 [81 P.2d 894]; Hough v. Orleans E. S.
Dist., 62 Cal.App.2d 146, 155 [144 P.2d 383]; Buzzard v.
East Lake School Dist., 34 Cal.App.2d 316, 321 [93 P.2d 233] ;
Ellis v. Burns Valley School Dist., 128 Cal.App. 550, 553 [18
P.2d 79] .) The plaintiffs take the position that the jury
reasonably might have found that the defendants failed to
maintain proper supervisorial control of the manner in which
the game was played.
In their physical education classes, the boys received instruction in the rules of touch football, including demonstrations of the correct methods of blocking and tackling. They
were skilled in the game, having played it many times previously. Immediately prior to the contest, they again were
instructed that blocking was to be done with both feet on
the ground, and were warned that rough play would not be
tolerated. Perrin, the physical education instructor, acted
as referee and Hass, his assistant, as head linesman. The injury occurred in the course of a play executed in accordance
with the rules of the game; no charge is made that any of
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the players conducted himself improperly. In short, there
i1; no evidence sufficient to predicate negligence upon a failure
to supervise the playing of the game.
'l'he Pirkles assert that the defendants were negligent in
the manner in which the players were segregated. They
contend that the jury reasonably might have found that the
defendants should not have allowed boys of such different
weights to play in the game in which William was injured.
Specifically, they argue, the players should have been segregated according to an "exponent chart" which was used
in connection with the required physical education programs
and interschool games.
Physical education programs in the elementary schools are
an accepted part of the curriculum. (Ed. Code, § 8252;
Underhill v. Alameda E. S. Dist., 133 Cal.App. 733, 735 [24
P.2d 849] .) A recognized and desirable part of such programs consists of organized free play games of the type here
concer1wd. (Kerby v. Elk Grove Union H. S. Dist., 1 Cal.App.
2d 246, 248 [36 P.2d 431].) However, the difficulty in administering such activity is well illustrated by the evidence
in the present case. To fill the teams, 22 boys must be selected from those desiring to play. Such selection must be
made in a manner permitting the smaller boys to compete
with safety and some degree of success, and yet without
denying to the larger boys opportunity to participate. If
the classification is made too narrow and rigid, particularly
in the smaller schools, a sufficient number of players will not
be available to make up the teams.
[2] The record shows that the selection of players for
free play games according to grades is a convenient and practical method of segregation. That such method is utilized
throughout the state is competent evidence of the reasonableness of its use by the defendants in the present case.
(Perurnean v. Wills, 8 Cal.2d 578, 583 [67 P.2d 96] .) [3] All
the evidence is to the effect that touch football is not a dangerous or rough game. Several witnesses testified that, although the practice of matching the seventh against the
eighth grade had been followed extensively throughout the
county, they knew of no serious injury prior to the one to
Pirkle. From this evidence, it must be concluded that the
method of segregation employed by the defendants was a
reasonable one.
[4] This determination is not affected by the fact that
so-called ''exponent charts'' were used in connection with
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interscholastic contests and in the required physical education periods. Such charts classify the pupils according to
certain combinations of age, height, and weight. According
to the evidence, apart from the fact that they are useful only
where there is a large group of boys to draw from, the charts
are designed primarily to present equal opportunities of competition, and, if at all, only partially for the safety of the
participants. However, the uncontradicted testimony of school
officials using the chart is to the effect that the classifications are broad enough to permit a variation in weights at
least as great as that involved in the present case. In addition, players in the lower classifications are permitted to compete in the higher ones if they possess sufficient skill. In
short, the evidence fails to establish such charts as a standard of care, the failure to observe which may be deemed negligence.
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the holding in
Bellman v. San Francisco H. S. Dist., 11 Cal.2d 576 [81 P.2d
894]. In the Bellman case, a high school girl was injured
during a required physical education period while attempting to perform a tumbling exercise. There was evidence
from which the jury reasonably might have found that the
exercise was inherently dangerous and that its performance
required, in addition to physical strength and agility, a proper
mental attitude. At the time she attempted the exercise,
the girl was suffering from a knee injury, and she was taking
part in the class against her wishes. The record also showed
that the physical instructor in charge knew that she had
failed in prior attempts to perform the trick. It was held
that liability might be imposed only where the evidence
showed a failure on the part of the school officials to use
ordinary care. "What is ordinary care depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case and is to be determined
as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of
the parties." (P. 582.) A majority of the court joined in
the conclusion that those facts justified the submission of the
issue of negligence to the jury. Three justices dissented upon
the ground that, even under the unusual circumstances presented in that case, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of negligence.
The facts of the present case, however, are readily distinguishable. [5] The activity here involved was not an
inherently dangerous one. The boys were selected according
to their skill and by a reasonable means of classification. They
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were properly instructed, experienced, and proficient, and
they participated in the game only if they chose to do so.
Under such circumstances, there is no legal basis for a finding of negligence.
(6] Nor is there merit in the contention that liability may
be predicated upon a failure to provide prompt medical attention. Plain tiffs' medical expert, the sole witness to testify
on this point, stated that a layman could not reasonably
have been expected to discover the nature of the injury sooner
and, in any event, no injury resulted to the boy from the
delay.
[7] The evidence being insufficient to sustain the verdict
and judgment, the defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. Under
such circumstances, this court may order judgment to be
so entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629 ; Jordan v. Guerra, 23
Cal.2d 469, 472 [144 P.2d 349]; Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 543 [129 P.2d 503].)
The judgment and the order denying the motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict are reversed and the
trial court is directed to enter its order granting said motions.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, .T.-I dissent.
The majority of this court has again invaded the realm
of fact finding, and in violation of the settled rule that
facts must be determined in the trial court, has found and
determined the issues of fact contrary to the trier of factthe jury in this case-and the trial judge who denied motions
for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and a new trial. In so holding, this court again denies
litigants the right to a jury trial on issues of fact in a case
where a trial by jury is admittedly a matter of right under
the Constitution and laws of this state.
What was the ultimate issue of fact to be determined in
this case? It was whether or not the conduct of the individual defendants was that of a reasonably prudent person
under like circumstances. If the conduct was not such, he was
negligent, and if such negligent conduct was a proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, liability was established.
It must be remembered that a jury and trial judge heard
the evidence in this case and concluded that the conduct of
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either Gripenstraw or Perrin or both of them was not that of
a reasonably prudent person and that either or both of them
was or were negligent. It cannot be denied that this ultimate
fact was so determined.
The members of the jury and trial judge are presumed to
have ''reasonable minds.'' They saw the participants and saw
and heard the witnesses and must have concluded that a
reasonably prudent person would not have permitted boys
ranging in weight from 85 to 190 pounds to engage in a
game of touch football under the circumstances there depicted. These fact finders, with ''reasonable minds,'' may
have felt that a reasonably prudent person in charge of the
playground would have applied the "exponent chart" which
was admitted to be "partially for the safety of the participants" in such a game. These fact finders, with "reasonable
minds,'' may have disbelieved the witnesses who testified that
touch football, when played as described by them, would not
endanger the life or limb of the participants. In short, these
fact finders with "reasonable minds," on whom the Constitution and law of this state places the responsibility of determining issues of fact, concluded from the evidence that a reasonably prudent person would not have permitted little Willie
Pirkle, 13 years, 4 months of age, 5 feet, 4 inches tall and
weighing 97 pounds to play in a game of touch football with
big, overgrown Jackie Perkins, 14 years, 6 months of age, 5
feet, 10 inches tall and weighing 145 pounds, and th11t in so
doing Mr. Gripenstraw or Mr. Perrin or both were guilty
of negligence.
Now, a majority of this court says that this jury and this
trial judge did not possess "reasonable minds"; that they
are not entitled to the benefit of the presumption which the
law has bestowed upon them-that they possess ''reasonable
minds"; and that the constitutional mandate and statutory
provisions relating to the function of a jury and a trial judge
are of no force or effect whatsoever as this court arrogates to
itself both the fact finding and law making powers.
No evidence of negligence, the majority says. But what
is the test for determining when negligence is a question of
fact or a question of law? The only test mentioned in the
lawbooks is the so called "reasonable minds" test. That is,
where the evidence is such that ''reasonable minds'' cannot
differ as to the conclusion to be reached, it is a question of
law. The majority does not mention this test or any other
test. It simply declares arbitrarily, contrary to the conclusion
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reached by the jury and trial judge, that there was "no negligence." But suppose little ·willie Pirkle was only 8 years of
age, 4 feet tall and weighed only 60 pounds and big, overgrown Jackie Perkins was 16 years of age, 6 feet tall and
weighed 200 pounds, and the record was the same in other
respects, 'what would the majority say~ If it would find there
was negligence in such a case, where should the line be drawn 7
It seems only reasonable to me that if this court intends to
overthrow the ''reasonable minds'' test as it has done in this
case, it should lay down some other test or standard for determining when the issue of negligence is one of fact or law.
The present decision places the determination of this issue
within the arbitrary power of four members of this court
without regard to any test, standard or rule to guide either
this court or any lower court in future cases. Thus, the reason
of the law is superseded by the arbitrary rule of four men.
Obviously this rule will change from time to time as the
philosophy of the majority changes.
The decision which the majority of this court has rendered
in this case resolving an issue of fact contrary to the conclusion reached by the jury and the trial judge is more farreaching than its effect upon the law applicable to this particular case. In effect, it is an attack upon the jury system.
By this decision the majority of this court says to the people
of California, You can write into your Constitution and
statutes that litigants in cases of this character are entitled
to a trial by jury, but regardless of the determination by the
jury of the factual issues, a majority of this court will have
the last say as to the determination of the factual issues. This
means that when a majority of this court desires to overthrow
the factual determination by a jury it may do so regardless of
the nature and character of the evidence supporting such
determination.
The volumes of the reported decisions of this court contain
the record of the Justices of this court who have expressed
their views on the effect of factual determinations by juries
and it may be gleaned therefrom that some of those Justices
have not been in accord with the constitutional and statutory
provisions which make the jury system a part of our system
of jurisprudence. While the validity of these provisions
has been settled beyond the realm of successful attack, the
operation of the system is greatly restricted and rendered
ineffective by decisions such as this, which are becoming more
numerous as the decisions of the present court are rendered.
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By such decisions a bare majority of this court may snatch
from a litigant his property and rights gained through the
lawful process of a jury trial, thereby depriving such litigant
of one of his most valuable, fundamental, constitutional rights,
guaranteed by both the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of California. Such is the situation in the
case at bar. As one who believes in preserving the American
way of life and upholding and supporting the Constitutions
which guarantee the continuance of that way of life, I cannot
refrain from expressing my unqualified disapproval of this
decision and those of similar import which is now the trend
of decision by the majority of this court.
Because I believe in upholding the constitutional guarantee
of the right of trial by jury and the statutory law of this
state which confers upon a jury anq trial judge the exclusive
power of determining the facts in a case such as this, and
because it appears beyond question that an honest evaluation
of the record in this case must necessarily resolve the issue
of negligence here to be one of fact which must be determined
by the jury and trial judge in accordance with the process of
law as defined in our Constitution and statutes, I would affirm
the judgment in this case.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March
9, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

